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OVERLOOKING CANON: HOW THE ALABAMA SUPREME
COURT USED A FOOTNOTE TO DISREGARD TRIBAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN WILKES v. PCI GAMING
AUTHORITY
Ridge Howell*
I. Introduction
The Poarch Band of Creek Indians—unsuccessfully—petitioned for a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court following an Alabama Supreme
Court decision against it. In Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority,1 a decision
proving disastrous for tribes across the country, the Alabama high court
rejected the time-honored doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The
court’s decision against the Poarch Band of Creek Indians defies Supreme
Court precedent and congressional authority, both of which have, for well
over a century, reinforced a tribe’s right to sovereign immunity in the
absence of waiver. Further, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision is a
clear intrusion on federal law, an area in which state courts do not have the
power to rule. Supreme Court precedent is clear; it is of upmost importance
to examine it and consider the implications flowing from the Alabama
court’s decision, not just for the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, but for all
tribes.
II. Law Before the Case
In Wilkes, the Supreme Court of Alabama, like many courts throughout
history, was asked to address the common law doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity. However, unlike previous courts, the Alabama Supreme Court
reached a shocking conclusion by consciously rejecting precedent—holding
that a tribe could be sued, despite the absence of congressional or tribal
waiver. While the general premise behind the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is simple—one cannot sue a sovereign government—the
doctrine’s origin in common law renders its application significantly more
nuanced. Rather than defining the contours and scope of tribal immunity
with one specific piece of legislation, courts should defer to years of
precedent when addressing a tribe’s immunity from suit. In order to
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. No. 17-1175, 2017 WL 4385738 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017). The case is known on appeal
as Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes. See 139 S. Ct. 305 (2018) (mem.).
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understand the scope of the issue, it is paramount to address how the
Supreme Court has historically discerned the limits of tribal immunity.
Although the Court’s relatively recent decisions in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.2 and Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community3 are most commonly cited, the concept of tribal
sovereign immunity made its first appearance in Supreme Court precedent
nearly two centuries ago. The first three cases, known as the Marshall
Trilogy, began with Johnson v. M’Intosh4 in 1823, followed by Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia5 in 1831, and Worcester v. Georgia6 a year later. Lastly,
the 1919 landmark opinion Turner v. United States7 established tribal
sovereign immunity as we know it today.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh was the first time the
Court established federal supremacy over tribes. Johnson, on its face, dealt
with a property dispute involving land granted by the Illinois and
Piankeshaw Indians.8 However, the primary takeaway is, in deciding that
tribal lands could only be transferred to the federal government, the Court
established that federal law governed the Tribe. 9
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court characterized Indian
tribes as “domestic dependent nations” that are not subject to state
regulation but are rather “completely under the sovereignty and dominion
of the United States.”10 This 1831 case thus equated tribes to a level of
statehood. One year later, the Court reinforced the idea that tribes should be
afforded status equal to that of states by holding, in Worcester v. Georgia,
that “Indian territory [is] completely separated from that of the states,” and
that any interaction with tribes is to be carried out solely by the federal
government.11 The Court described tribes as distinct communities, holding
their own territory and boundaries “in which the laws of [the state] can have
no force.”12 States had no power over tribes or tribal lands because, as
stated above, this power was explicitly reserved for the federal

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

523 U.S. 751 (1998).
572 U.S. 782 (2014).
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
248 U.S. 354 (1919).
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
Id. at 587.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557.
Id. at 520.
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government.13 These two landmark cases illustrate early conversations
regarding the federal government’s sole authority to govern tribal affairs. In
essence, these cases laid the foundation for the Supreme Court to establish
the borders between state rights and tribal sovereignty, carried out through
“the clear doctrine of federal preeminence and Congressional authority over
Indian affairs.”14
While Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia are
responsible for promulgating the “supremacy of the federal government
[which] has been a staple of Indian affairs,”15 the notion of tribal sovereign
immunity was brought to fruition in Turner v. United States. In Turner,
individual members of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation were sued for tearing
down a fence built on Indian lands by a ranching company that had Tribal
authorization to build it.16 After the company failed to secure compensation
from the Tribe, the federal government briefly seized control over the
Tribe. 17 With express authorization from Congress, the ranching company
sued both the Tribe and “the United States as trustee of [the Tribe’s]
funds.”18 The Supreme Court held, apart from receiving authorization from
Congress or express tribal consent, a Tribe cannot be sued in any court.19
Thus, though the ranching company did receive authorization from
Congress to sue in this scenario, the essential takeaway is—for the first
time—the Court makes clear that absent congressional authorization or
tribal waiver, tribes retain their right to sovereign immunity.
The Turner Court reasoned that tribes exercise sovereign powers because
they have fully functioning governments, laws, and systems of checks and
balances with executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 20 One stone left
unturned in Turner, which was later addressed in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
13. Id.
14. Brief for Amicus Curiae United South & Eastern Tribes, Inc., in Support of
Petitioners at 17, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, No. 17-1175 (U.S. Mar. 26,
2018),
https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/cert_amicus_united_south_and_
eastern_tribes.pdf.
15. Brief of Indian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16,
Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, No. 17-1175 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2018),
https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/cert_amici_scholars.pdf [hereinafter Brief of
Indian Law Scholars].
16. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357 (1919).
17. Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 5.
18. Turner, 248 U.S. at 357; see also Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 26, 35 Stat. 444,
457.
19. Turner, 248 U.S. at 358.
20. Id. at 355.
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v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., was the applicability of tribal
sovereign immunity to tort cases. 21 Tort cases are distinct because of the
possibility that an individual, without willingly entering into a relationship
with a tribe, could develop a tort claim against a tribe. Because tribes hold
sovereign immunity, the individual is left without a remedy under these
circumstances. However, the Turner Court could not have reached its
conclusion without explicitly recognizing tribal sovereign immunity. 22
Thus, Turner established that “Indian tribes are immune from all claims
arising in tort unless Congress or the tribe consents to the suit or waives
immunity.”23
In 1986, the Supreme Court reinforced tribal sovereign immunity
through Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering.24 This case further defined the broad scope of sovereign
immunity that tribes enjoy and reinforced that tribal immunity is only
subordinate to federal law or a tribe’s decision to waive it. In Three
Affiliated Tribes, the tribes sued a nonmember for tort and contract claims
in state court.25 The case followed a state court decision disallowing tribes
from suing in state court unless they waived their tribal sovereign
immunity. 26 The Supreme Court reversed because it found the waiver
requirement to be “unduly intrusive” on tribal common law sovereign
immunity, as immunity “is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and
self-governance.”27 The Court referenced the potentially disastrous
declension of tribal governance which tribes would be subjected to by
acquiescing to “coercive jurisdiction” by state courts for issues arising on
tribal lands.28
The court in Three Affiliated Tribes clarified that sovereign immunity is
an issue of federal law: “[I]n the absence of federal authorization, tribal
immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty, is privileged from
diminution by the States.”29 Further, because “any potential counterclaims
involved in that matter would have sounded in tort,” Three Affiliated Tribes

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756–57 (1998).
Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 6.
Id.
476 U.S. 877 (1986).
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id. at 890–91.
Id. at 891.
Id.
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recognized that tribes are immune—even in the case of a tort—in any case
without the tribe’s consent or congressional approval. 30
The common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has continually
resurfaced in recent cases. The Supreme Court, however, has remained
vigilant in upholding tribal immunity, be it “on or off reservation, in a
governmental or a commercial context, in contract or tort.”31 This was seen
in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,32 where
the Court considered tribal sovereign immunity in the context of civil
contract suits.33
Although Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
was based on a contract claim, the Court used the case to address tribal
sovereignty with respect to the unique nature of tort claims—specifically
considering scenarios where tribal sovereign immunity has the ability to
injure individuals unaware of tribal immunity and situations where an
individual did not choose to deal with a tribe, as seen in tort cases. 34 The
Court recognized the potential dangers that can accompany sovereign
immunity, but the holding clearly emphasizes that sovereign immunity
extends to tribes in tort cases. This case is a prime example of the
importance the Supreme Court has placed on the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity. Even in the face of adverse consequences, the Court
defends tribal immunity and shows steadfast deference to legislative action.
The Kiowa Court emphasized that the subject and legality of tribal
immunity should be considered by Congress, not by courts.35 The Court
echoed the Three Affiliated Tribes decision to fully uphold sovereign
immunity unless Congress allows the suit or the tribe waives its
immunity. 36 The Supreme Court explicitly chose to follow prior precedent,
completely deferring to Congress, believing in Congress’s wisdom and
ability to limit tribal sovereign immunity through legislative action.37 Thus,
because Congress has yet to say otherwise, the Court, once again, ruled that
sovereign immunity governed. 38 In addition to upholding tribal immunity,

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 7.
Id.
523 U.S. 751 (1998).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 760–61.
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Kiowa also reiterated that sovereign immunity “is a matter of federal law
and is not subject to diminution by the States.”39
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiowa, Congress considered
two bills that attempted to bring clarity to tribal immunity from tort claims.
The first, the American Indian Tort Liability Insurance Act, explored the
option of giving federal courts jurisdiction over tort actions, and by doing
so, waiving tribal immunity. 40 The second, the American Indian Equal
Justice Act, proposed waiving tribal sovereign immunity on tort cases,
while giving both federal and state courts jurisdiction to preside over
tribes.41 This Act was intended to equate tribal liability to that which nonsovereign individuals and entities hold.42 Congress held extensive hearings
on both of these bills.43 It is paramount to recognize that both of these bills
would have waived tribal sovereign immunity, and both of these bills
ultimately failed. 44 The failing of both bills seemingly signifies that
Congress does not wish to detract from tribal sovereign immunity.
The conversation about sovereign immunity did not end with Kiowa. The
Supreme Court addressed tribal sovereign immunity again in Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Community,45 which involved an alleged breach of a
gaming compact between the Tribe and the State of Michigan. 46 The
compact allowed the Tribe to operate a casino on tribal land within
Michigan but prohibited the Tribe from doing so elsewhere. 47 Bay Mills
subsequently opened a second casino on property “purchased through a
congressionally established land trust,” with the belief that it qualified as
tribal land.48 Michigan did not agree, and the State accordingly sued Bay
Mills under a statute allowing a state to enjoin gaming activity located on
Indian lands when it violates a tribal-state compact.49
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit found the
Michigan suit barred by tribal sovereign immunity, noting Congress has
39. Id. at 756.
40. See S. 2302, 105th Cong. (1998), discussed in Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra
note 15, at 12–13.
41. See S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998), discussed in Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra
note 15, at 12–13.
42. Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 12–13.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id.
45. 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
46. Id. at 787.
47. Id. at 786.
48. Id. at 782.
49. Id. at 786–87.
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neither passed legislation nor provided Michigan a waiver to file suit. 50
Importantly, the statute “only authorized suits to enjoin gaming activity
located ‘on Indian lands,’” and Michigan’s primary contention was that the
land in question was outside of tribal territory. 51 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court held Michigan’s suit was barred by tribal sovereign immunity. 52 Once
again, this decision echoes a promise of deference to legislation.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly deferred to congressional authority on
the issue of tribal sovereign immunity because of tribes’ unique status as
nations within, yet apart, from the United States. Thus, the judiciary tends
to resist any decision which could jeopardize the centuries-old protected
status of tribes. In reaching its decision in Bay Mills, the Supreme Court
cited its long history in upholding tribal sovereign immunity. Justice Kagan,
writing for the Court, termed Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations”
who exercise intrinsic sovereign authority,53 while also, because of their
dependent status, fall under the plenary power of Congress. 54 Justice Kagan
emphasized that Indian tribes remain “separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution,”55 concluding that “unless and ‘until Congress acts, [tribes]
retain’ their historic sovereign authority.”56 Justice Kagan further stressed
that tribal sovereign immunity, despite the amount of times it has come
before the Court, is and will continue to be settled law, absent tribal waiver
or congressional authorization.57
The Supreme Court in Bay Mills also referenced steps Congress took
following its decision in Kiowa. 58 While Congress directly referenced
Kiowa and considered abrogating tribal immunity in regard to most torts,
they ultimately decided against it, taking a decidedly less intrusive
approach, instead “requiring tribes either to disclose or to waive their

50. Id. at 787.
51. Id. at 782.
52. Id. at 785.
53. Id. at 788.
54. Id.; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004) (“Congress, with this
Court’s approval, has interpreted the Constitution’s ‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing
it to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions on tribal
sovereign authority.”).
55. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56
(1978)).
56. Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
57. Id. at 789 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756
(1998)).
58. Id. at 794.
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immunity in contracts needing the Secretary of the Interior’s approval.” 59
The Bay Mills Court concluded by emphasizing that “it is fundamentally
Congress’s job, not ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal
immunity.”60 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bay Mills illustrates current
precedent regarding the common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.
This legal background brings us to the present case—Wilkes v. PCI
Gaming Authority. In Wilkes, Respondents Casey Wilkes and Alexander
Russell61 rely on an argument hinging on footnote 8 of the majority opinion
in Bay Mills.62 Footnote 8 highlights that the Supreme Court has never
addressed “whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort
victim, or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no
alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.” 63
Although this footnote initiates a fervent conversation between the parties,
its status as a footnote falls short to undermine the Bay Mills majority’s
precedential value. Although insignificant compared to the multitudes of
tribal sovereignty precedent, this lone footnote has resulted in the State of
Alabama abandoning years of consistent Supreme Court precedent to reach
a surprising outcome.
III. Statement of the Case
The Supreme Court of Alabama sent ripples through the legal
community via its decision in Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority.64 The
Alabama court, tasked with answering the question of whether an Indian
tribe is immune from civil liability for tort claims asserted by non-members,
abrogated the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Chief Justice Stuart, in
his opinion, explained that because the Supreme Court has acknowledged it
has never applied sovereign immunity “in a situation such as this,” the
Alabama court will not extend the doctrine “beyond the circumstances to
which that Court itself has applied it.”65 Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court
held “that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity affords the tribal
defendants no protection from the claims asserted by Wilkes and Russell.”66
59.
60.
61.
2017).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 802.
Id. at 800.
Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Auth., No. 17-1175, 2017 WL 4385738, at *3 (Ala. Sept. 29,
Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 799 n.8.
Id.
No. 17-1175, 2017 WL 4385738.
Id. at *4.
Id.
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A. Facts
Petitioners, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, employed Barbie
Spraggins, who worked at the Tribe’s Wind Creek-Wetumpka gaming
facility.67 Spraggins worked as a facilities manager at the casino and hotel
for over a year prior to the incident provoking this case. 68 During her
employment, Spraggins continually struggled with alcohol abuse during
work hours.69 There were at least six times that Spraggins’ supervisor
reported her for smelling like alcohol at work. 70 Spraggins blood-alcohol
content was tested multiple times while at work, with a test in February of
2014 revealing a blood-alcohol content of .078.71 Following this test,
Spraggins enrolled in an employee assistance program, which included
sessions with a counselor; she attended this program for nearly half a year. 72
Only four months after completing the employee assistance program,
Spraggins crashed into Casey Wilkes and Alexander Russell on the Mortar
Creek Bridge, triggering the Wilkes litigation. 73 On the day of the collision,
Spraggins arrived to work at 8:00 a.m. after a heavy night of drinking. 74
Within three hours after arriving, Spraggins decided to leave work and go
to a Wind Creek-Wetumpka maintained warehouse located ten miles
away.75 Spraggins took a company vehicle intending to retrieve decor
needed for hotel rooms at the warehouse. 76 On her quest, Spraggins hit a
guardrail on the Mortar Creek Bridge, crossed into oncoming traffic, and hit
the vehicle containing Wilkes and Russell in a head-on collision.77
The bridge is eight miles west of Wind Creek-Wetumpka gaming
facility, is not on reservation lands, and is not en route to the warehouse
where Spraggins picked up the lamp shades. 78 The facts, however, are
unclear as to where Spraggins went after picking up the lamps or how
Spraggins ended up on the bridge where the collision occurred. Spraggins,
intoxicated at the time of the collision, did not remember why she was on
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Mortar Creek Bridge. 79 When tested an hour and forty-five minutes
after the crash, she had a blood-alcohol content of .293, significantly higher
than the .08 legal limit.80
Following the collision, Wilkes and Russell brought suit against
Spraggins and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians as her employer. 81 Wilkes
and Russell alleged negligence and wantonness claims against both named
defendants.82 The claims against the Tribe were based on the fact that
Spraggins had a known history of alcohol abuse and intoxication while at
work. 83
B. Decision
Wilkes and Russell filed suit against Spraggins and the Poarch Band of
Creek Indians in the Elmore County Circuit Court in Alabama on February
16, 2015.84 Wilkes and Russell’s amended complaint “asserted negligence
and wantonness claims” against Spraggins and the Tribe based on her
operation of the vehicle resulting in the accident, as well as negligence and
wantonness claims against the Tribe for its “hiring retention and
supervision of Spraggins.”85 Following discovery, the Tribe moved for
summary judgment, arguing that (1) as a federally recognized tribe, the
Poarch Band of Creek Indians was “protected by the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity”; or, in the alternative, (2) “Spraggins was not acting
within the scope of her employment at the time of the January 2015
accident.”86 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Tribe,
finding an absence of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the Tribe’s
sovereign immunity.87 After the trial court ruled for the Tribe, Wilkes and
Russell appealed; the Supreme Court of Alabama then granted their
appeal.88 The Supreme Court of Alabama’s sole issue to consider was
whether “the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity shields tribal defendants
from the tort claims asserted by Wilkes and Russell.” 89

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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IV. Analysis
The Supreme Court of Alabama reached its decision—the Poarch Band
of Creek Indians was not protected by common law sovereign immunity—
relying on one primary avenue. The Alabama Supreme Court put forth an
argument completely centered on footnote 8 of the majority opinion and the
dissenting opinion put forth by Justice Thomas in Bay Mills. The footnote
explains that the Supreme Court has yet to “specifically [address] . . .
whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other
plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe has no alternative way to
obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.”90 The Alabama
Supreme Court believed that this case, involving Wilkes and Russell suing
a tribal defendant for a tort action, fell under the footnote’s proposed
scenario.91 Thus, the Alabama court took the footnote as providing the
means to disagree with established precedent. The argument advanced by
the Alabama Supreme Court is unsatisfactory. The argument lays an
insufficient foundation to overturn a common law doctrine which has been
developed by courts for over a century.
A. Foundation of Respondents’ Stance
As explored above, Supreme Court precedent and the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity have remained virtually unscathed. While
many cases reaffirm the notion of tribal immunity, Kiowa and Bay Mills are
the two most prominent in setting forth the appropriate foundation. The two
cases depict how common law sovereign immunity is viewed through the
eyes of both Congress and the Supreme Court. While the two cases were
brought in the context of contract claims, the Court made it clear that tribal
sovereign immunity does not just apply to contract cases. Rather, immunity
applies to any case involving tribal sovereigns. However, while the two
cases gave what the Supreme Court—depicted in its majority holding in
Bay Mills—believed to be absolute tribal sovereign immunity, the Alabama
Supreme Court addressed a valid point: what happens when tribal sovereign
immunity is “contrary to the interests of justice, especially inasmuch as the
tort victims in this case” had no alleged “opportunity to negotiate with the
tribal defendants for a waiver of immunity”? 92
With this in mind, relying on the content in footnote 8 and the Alabama
Supreme Court decision, Respondents Wilkes and Russell advance several
90. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 799 n.8 (2014).
91. Wilkes, 2017 WL 4385738, at *4.
92. Id. at *4.
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arguments speaking to why they believe the Alabama Supreme Court’s
reasoning is correct. Foremost, Respondents argue the Alabama court did
not stray from authority, seeing as the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed tort immunity when the non-tribal party had not chosen to
interact with the tribe.93 Thus, Respondents argue the Alabama court
decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous holdings. 94
Further, Respondents draw on the idea that the decisions advanced in
Kiowa and Bay Mills are solely focused on the context of contracts,
implying that the common law doctrine of tribal immunity does not protect
tribes from other types of suits.95 Referencing the Court’s clear call for
congressional intervention following Kiowa, and the subsequent legislation
considered by Congress, Respondents focus on Congress’s “decision to
retain that form of tribal immunity.” 96 Concluding this prong of their
defense, Respondents argue that a tribe holds a “panoply of tools . . . to
enforce its law on its own lands.”97 In essence, Respondents see the
Alabama Supreme Court’s decision as falling squarely within the scope of
tribal immunity. They argue that the Poarch Band of Creek Indians’
arguments are centered on broad immunity, ignoring footnote 8 and the
discussion surrounding it in the Bay Mills dissent.98
In their brief opposing certiorari review, Respondents also argue that
“[t]here is no historical justification for applying tribal sovereign immunity
to off-reservation torts.”99 Wilkes and Russell claim the reasoning behind
this idea stems from a line in Kiowa, which describes common law tribal
sovereign immunity as developing almost by accident.100 However, this
point need not be addressed because it is created from cobbled bits of
sentences from various court cases, most of which occurred in the late
nineteenth century.101
As to Respondents’ claim that off-reservation torts are not covered by
tribal sovereign immunity, they once again rely on Justice Thomas’s dissent
in Bay Mills. Quoting the dissent, Respondents write, “Expanding tribal
93. Id. at *3.
94. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 6, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v.
Wilkes, No. 17-1175 (U.S. June 8, 2018), https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/
cert_opposition.pdf [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents].
95. Id.
96. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 801 (2014).
97. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at 7.
98. Id. at 7–8.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)).
101. Id. at 8–9.
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immunity to off-reservation activity is not only ‘unsupported by any
rationale for that doctrine’ but also ‘inconsistent with the limits on tribal
sovereignty.’”102 This argument is erroneous. As stated previously, the
Supreme Court has definitively ruled that tribal sovereign immunity, unless
Congress says otherwise, is unequivocal in its authority.103
The last leg of Respondents’ argument is focused on the immunity of
tribes versus other sovereigns. They believe “[p]ermitting tribes to assert
immunity for off-reservation torts would be particularly anomalous because
it would vest tribes with a form of immunity enjoyed by no other
sovereign.”104 Respondents argue that if Spraggins were employed by
another sovereign, such as a state or foreign nation, they would not fall
under sovereign immunities’ umbrella of protection. 105 This statement hits
at the very core of what sovereign immunity means to tribes. Tribes enjoy
that level of immunity because they are domestic dependent nations. Thus,
like states, but unlike foreign nations, tribes fall under congressional
authority; conversely, like foreign entities, but unlike states, tribes are
sovereign nations. This combination creates a level of sovereignty unlike
any other, which is why tribal immunity is completely unique. As Justice
Kagan said in the Bay Mills opinion, tribes are separate sovereigns, and
they are sovereigns that pre-exist the Constitution.106 Arguing that they
enjoy immunity unlike that of a state or a foreign nation goes to the very
core of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Furthermore, this
argument does not stand alone because Bay Mills made it unequivocally
clear that tribes enjoy sovereign immunity unless or until Congress
abrogates that protection. Since Congress has yet to do so, tribal sovereign
immunity stands.
B. Finding the Correct Interpretation of Footnote 8
Respondents did not want this case to be taken up on certiorari because,
as discussed more thoroughly below, precedent is against them. This is
illustrated by the holdings of the Supreme Court, at least three circuit courts
(the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh), and several state supreme courts. 107
102. Id. at 11 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 813 (2014)).
103. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 790.
104. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at 12.
105. Id.
106. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788.
107. Id.; see Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2008); Furry v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 685 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012); Maxwell v. City of
San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2013); Morgan v. Colo. River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d
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Instead, Respondents want the Supreme Court to allow lower courts to
“reconsider their positions,” most of which rule in favor of tribal sovereign
immunity. 108 Wilkes and Russell believe the Supreme Court would “benefit
from allowing the issue to percolate further in the lower courts before it
intervenes to elaborate on Bay Mills.”109 The implications of this assertion
are dangerous; this opens the door of dissention between the courts,
potentially resulting in negative ramifications for tribes everywhere.
Respondents’ argument struggles for many reasons, all of which boil
down to a misrepresentation of footnote 8. Respondents set out to show that
footnote 8 is a call to action—a statement granting lower courts permission
to go against precedent. This argument is built on sand, as footnote 8 lacks
any precedential force. As it reads, footnote 8 in Bay Mills is merely a
comment on scenarios the Supreme Court has not addressed. At its core,
however, footnote 8 is a reinforcement of the Court’s decisions in Kiowa
and Bay Mills. The comment put forward by Justice Thomas speaks to the
broad sovereign immunity the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of time and
time again. Respondents’ characterization pits one footnote against more
than one hundred years of federal Indian law.
As stated previously, footnote 8 states that the Supreme Court has yet to
address if immunity applies in the “ordinary way” when a tort victim or
individual who has not willingly entered into a relationship with the tribe
“has no alternative way” to acquire relief from “off-reservation commercial
conduct.”110 Respondents’ footnote 8 argument first fails because they
assert that they have no alternative way to obtain relief. This assumption
ignores the potential of possible relief from suing Spraggins alone, thus
avoiding the Tribe and the issue of sovereign immunity completely.
Nonetheless, Respondents argue that applying immunity would leave
Wilkes and Russell “without a remedy” for the wrongs allegedly committed
by the Tribe. 111 The inability to sue the Tribe does not take away from the
possibility of full recovery. Respondents, hyper-focused as they are on the
tort claim against the Tribe, overlook two crucial points. First, sovereign
immunity, absent waiver or congressional intervention, provides full
protection from suit. While Respondents argue that immunity should be
421 (Ariz. 1968); Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Conn., 918 A.2d 880 (Conn.
2007); Seneca Tel. Co. v. Miami Tribe of Okla., 253 P.3d 53 (Okla. 2011); Sheffer v.
Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., 315 P.3d 359 (Okla. 2013).
108. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at 5.
109. Id.
110. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 799 n.8.
111. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at 15.
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abrogated in this case, under the scenario described in footnote 8, they are
actually arguing for a full upheaval of tribal immunity. If limited in the way
Respondents argue it should be, tribal immunity becomes more akin to
conditioned liability than any real form of sovereignty. Naturally, this goes
against precedent and the basic premise that tribes are domestic, sovereign
nations.
Second, their argument fails to acknowledge that the inability to gain
recovery from the Tribe is part of the privilege held by tribes as sovereigns.
After all, any application of the concept of immunity will leave the
opposing party without a remedy. However, this does not mean that
Respondents are remediless, only that they cannot recover from the Tribe.
In this case, Respondents have the potential, although they ignore it, to “be
made completely whole” by filing a suit against Spraggins herself.112 This
illuminates the fact that this case is not the scenario described in footnote 8.
Footnote 8 theorizes a case where the injured party is left without a remedy.
Thus, because full recovery is available to Respondents via Spraggins, there
is “no need to sue the Tribe to right the wrong [alleged].”113
The notion that Respondents could fully recover from the accident by
suing Spraggins is reinforced by Lewis v. Clarke,114 a case the Supreme
Court addressed in 2016. This case involved a tort claim occurring offreservation.115 A tribal employee, in the course of his work, crashed into
Lewis, an individual with no relationship with the Tribe. 116 Lewis sued
Clarke in his individual capacity.117 On certiorari, the Court considered
whether or not tribal sovereign immunity protects an employee from
individual capacity damages from torts committed within their scope of
employment. 118 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lewis, observing that
the tort action was against the employee, not the Tribe itself. 119 Therefore,
since the party in interest was Clarke, acting in an individual capacity, tribal
sovereign immunity is not implicated.120 It is crucial to note the parallels
between this case and Wilkes. Foremost, Lewis sounded in tort for off112. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, No. 171175 (U.S. June 26, 2018), https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/cert_reply_
petitioner.pdf.
113. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 799 n.8.
114. 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017).
115. Id. at 1289.
116. Id. at 1290.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1288.
119. Id. at 1289.
120. Id.
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reservation conduct, which according to Respondent’s reading of footnote
8, would mean that sovereign immunity should have been overturned. Yet,
once again, the Court recognized that tribal sovereign immunity stands.
Moreover, this is the perfect example of a case in which the plaintiffs were
able to reach a remedy without suing the tribe in question. This further
reinforces the fact that Respondents could be made whole without suing the
Poarch Band of Creek Indians.
Respondents’ argument regarding footnote 8 also fails because they are
suing for conduct that occurred both off and on the reservation, while the
footnote only speaks to “off-reservation commercial conduct.”121 One of the
allegations against Petitioner is for “negligent and wanton hiring, retention,
and supervision of Spraggins.”122 Alabama law dictates that a claim arises
at “the location of the wrongful acts or omissions.” 123 Thus, under Alabama
law, the alleged negligent actions occurred on the reservation. This clearly
falls outside of footnote 8’s “off-reservation commercial conduct” ambit. 124
In ruling for Respondents, the Alabama Supreme Court reached its holding
without considering precedent, hinging its rationale solely on footnote 8,
coincidentally going even further than Respondents’ suggestion. If the
Alabama court followed Respondents’ interpretation of footnote 8 exactly,
it would have ruled in favor of Respondents and against the Tribe because
Spraggins was an employee of the Tribe who was arguably in the course of
her work when the accident happened. The Alabama Supreme Court,
however, went beyond Respondents’ claim and decided tribes are liable for
torts off or on the reservation. This opens up the Tribe to liability in any tort
case, regardless of where it happens, effectively destroying tribal
sovereignty.
Further, setting the Supreme Court holdings in Kiowa and Bay Mills
aside, footnote 8 itself reinforces the common law doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity. As Petitioners state in their reply brief to Respondents,
the footnote “says nothing about how courts should address that situation in
the future, nor does it even hint that immunity would not be available under
the Court’s existing precedent.”125 The Court, throughout the opinion and
within footnote 8, explains with emphasis that any deviation away from
precedent requires special justification.126 In short, the Court and Congress
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 799 n.8 (2014).
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at 15.
Ex parte Jim Burke Auto., Inc., 200 So. 3d 1153, 1156 (Ala. 2016).
Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 799 n.8.
Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 112, at 4.
Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 799 n.8.
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have examined sovereign immunity from all sides, yet, they have
maintained that tribes hold immunity without caveats. Thus, footnote 8 in
Bay Mills mandates that broad immunity should be given to tribes under the
common law doctrine, even in a scenario involving an off-reservation tort
“where the claimant has no other remedy.” 127 This further dispels any
arguments that the Court’s decisions in Kiowa and Bay Mills only apply to
contracts cases. The footnote, thus, presents no reason to go against
precedent, nor does it support Respondents’ proposed argument that lower
courts should be given more time to consider how they want to rule in the
context of off-reservation torts. This Court has routinely dismissed suits
against tribes, absent congressional authorization or waiver, making it
abundantly clear that the issue of tribal sovereign immunity is settled
law. 128
Apart from their arguments regarding footnote 8, Respondents Wilkes
and Russell fail to adequately address how circuit courts and state supreme
courts have dealt with similar issues involving tribal defendants, either
before or after the Court’s decision in Bay Mills. While Respondents argue
that the Court should not grant review, in the guise of allowing lower courts
further opportunity to reach their own decisions in similar scenarios,
Respondents leave out that many courts have ruled on these issues—the
majority of which have ruled in favor of tribal sovereign immunity.
Petitioners point out the decision in Bay Mills has yet to result in any
significant departure from adhering to precedential application of tribal
sovereignty.129 Petitioners reference two cases in support of their
proposition: (1) the Ninth Circuit decision of Arizona v. Tohono O’odham
Nation130 and (2) the Utah Supreme Court decision of Harvey v. Ute Indian
Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation.131 Both of these cases serve as
examples of courts applying immunity “to tort claims asserted by nonmembers.”132 These cases combat Respondents’ argument that “none of the
courts considered the issues raised by [the Bay Mills] decision.” 133
127. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 112, at 4.
128. See Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 789; see also Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998).
129. Id.
130. 818 F. 3d 549, 563 (9th Cir. 2016), cited in Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note
112, at 5.
131. 416 P.3d 401, 412-13 (Utah 2017), cited in Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note
112, at 4.
132. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 112, at 4–5.
133. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at 16.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

454

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Respondents argue the Ninth Circuit in Tohono O’odham rejected an
argument based on footnote 8 and instead adhered “to prior Ninth Circuit
holding[s] that tribal sovereign immunity bars tort claims.” 134 However,
regarding footnote 8, Tohono O’odham actually referenced the Supreme
Court’s discussion of stare decisis and, thus, declined “to depart from Ninth
Circuit precedent.”135 Even more recently, the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor
of tribal sovereign immunity in a slip and fall case where the accident
occurred at a tribal gaming center. 136 The Tenth Circuit emphasized that
state courts do not have jurisdiction over such matters, as tribes are
protected by their immune status.137
Another issue seen in Respondents’ reply to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is how they minimize the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding.
The Alabama court held that “the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
affords no protection to tribes with regard to tort claims asserted against
them by non-tribe members.”138 Two critical points come from this: (1) the
Alabama court asserts tribes are liable for torts off and on the reservation;
and (2) the court does not limit liability to individuals who have no standing
relationship with the tribe, meaning the tribe can be sued by an entity it is
associated with. This ruling far exceeds the scope of footnote 8 in Bay
Mills, which speaks only to a scenario involving an off-reservation tort
where an individual has no relation to the tribe. However, Respondents
taper the state court holding to fit into footnote 8, arguing for claims by
individuals without a “personal or commercial relationship” to the tribe
when they are harmed by off-reservation conduct.139 While this narrowing
fits closer to the scenario described in footnote 8, it is a misrepresentation
of the court’s decision, and, therefore, does not represent the potential
ramifications of the Alabama court decision.
Further, as Petitioners point out, “Even focusing on off-reservation
torts[,] . . . there remains a split. Many of the state supreme court and
federal court of appeals decisions . . . involved off-reservation torts. These
include (at least) the Ninth Circuit[] . . . [and] the Eleventh Circuit[],” as
134. Id.
135. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 112, at 5 (citing Arizona v. Tohono O’odham
Nation, 818 F. 3d 549, 563 n.8 (9th Cir. 2016)).
136. Navajo Nation v. Dalley, 896 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2018).
137. Id. at 1218.
138. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, No.
17-1175 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2018), https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/cert_
petition.pdf.
139. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at i.
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well as state supreme court decisions in Oklahoma, Connecticut, and
Arizona.140
In essence, regardless of how the issue is framed, this case presents a
pressing and frequent issue among lower courts, reinforcing the need for
intervention.
C. Impending Policy Issues
From a policy perspective, the Supreme Court’s decision not to grant
certiorari is unsettling, as Wilkes is an incorrect application of tribal
sovereign immunity. Ramifications from the Alabama decision have the
potential to interfere with tribal systems across the country. Further, this
case provided the perfect vehicle to reaffirm Supreme Court precedent in
favor of tribal sovereignty, specifically in reference to off-reservation torts.
Despite their denial, and the ramifications which may follow it, the Court
has been explicit when it comes to tribal sovereign immunity: it stands until
Congress says otherwise.
Alabama cannot rewrite federal Indian law even if equitable
considerations make circumventing tribal sovereign immunity attractive.
While lower courts across the country have upheld tribal sovereignty in
similar scenarios, denying this case on certiorari review voices the Court’s
apathy toward a critical tenant of tribal sovereignty. As this case was not
overturned, some courts will likely use Alabama’s decision as a pillar of
strength to flout federal precedent. Although the Supreme Court has been
very precise in its application of tribal sovereign immunity, reinforcing
precedent on many occasions, “state courts often apply that precedent only
reluctantly–even with disdain.”141 There is an understandable fear that,
because this decision stands, a recurrence of “historic patterns of disregard
for Tribal Nations and their sovereign status” will develop. 142 If so, the
result would be a storm of dangerous decisions—decisions that could lead
to the downfall of tribal governance altogether. There is potential that tribes
could cease to be the “domestic dependent nations” they were recognized as
140. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 112, at 6. See generally Cook v. AVI Casino
Enters., 548 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2008); Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 685 F.3d
1224 (11th Cir. 2012); Maxwell v. City of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2013);
Morgan v. Colo. River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968); Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe
of Indians of Conn., 918 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2007); Seneca Tel. Co. v. Miami Tribe of Okla.,
253 P.3d 53 (Okla. 2011); Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., 315 P.3d 359 (Okla.
2013).
141. Brief for Amicus Curiae United South & Eastern Tribes, supra note 14, at 5.
142. Id.
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in 1831.143 This clearly goes against established precedent, which
recognizes sovereignty as a “necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and
self-governance” that lies at the heart of tribal sovereign immunity. 144
On another front, allowing the disembodiment of tribal sovereignty can
create tangible challenges for tribes. Petitioners highlight that “exposing
tribes to tort suits could ‘impose serious financial burdens’ on already
‘financially disadvantaged’ tribes.”145 Although some tribes have had
widely publicized financial success, most tribes “still [struggle]
economically.”146 In Bay Mills, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion
illustrates that while public sentiment might argue if tribes are engaged in
“highly lucrative commercial activity” such as gaming, they can afford suit,
the reality is that such gaming income is monopolized by only a few tribes,
with “[n]early half of federally recognized Tribes . . . not operat[ing]
gaming facilities at all.”147 Thus, one of the tangible fears is that opening
tribes up to suits such as this will cause great financial burdens and threaten
their ability to survive. After all, tribes, unlike states, depend on their
sovereign status because they do not receive tax-based revenue.148
Further, tribal sovereignty is an issue that continually resurfaces in
litigation. The Supreme Court’s docket has seen a multitude of tribal
sovereignty cases in the last forty years. 149 Although deciding against the
Alabama court would not stop future misapplications of Indian law, it is
nearly certain that, as it has gone unaddressed, this scenario will emerge
more voraciously than ever before. This will create a massive strain on
tribes, regardless of their financial stability, and hinder the court system
and, thus, the mission behind following judicial precedent. Perhaps most
frustrating about the Court’s denial of certiorari is the fact that Wilkes is an
“ideal vehicle” to address the issue of tribal sovereignty in reference to offreservation torts.150 The question of tribal immunity in Wilkes is “squarely
raised, fully briefed, and resolved in opinions” with “the resolution of that
143. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831).
144. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877,
890 (1986).
145. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 138, at 22 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978)).
146. Id. (quoting Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 137, 168 (2004)).
147. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 809 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
148. Id. at 809–11.
149. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 138, at 23.
150. Id.
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question [being] dispositive” in the circuit court and the Alabama Supreme
Court.151 Therefore, for all of the reasons stated—from the multiple issues
presented by the Respondents’ footnote 8 argument, to the fact that this
case provides the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to cleanly rule
on this issue of tribal immunity—Wilkes should have been taken up on
certiorari. Nevertheless, it was not. If nothing else, the Supreme Court’s
choice to allow the decision to stand will send a call to action—more clear
than ever before—to Congress. Afterall, the duty of defining the scope of
tribal sovereign immunity falls directly at their feet.
V. Conclusion
The Alabama Supreme Court in Wilkes erred in overturning the
longstanding common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The
United States Supreme Court and Congress have been abundantly clear that
tribal sovereign immunity is solid, regardless of the type of case at issue.
Allowing the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision to stand will cause chaos
in lower courts, result in untold amounts of ill-earned damages, and chip
away at the hard-earned foundation created for tribes over the past century.
Although the Supreme Court has historically made sound decisions
regarding tribal sovereign immunity, denying certiorari here was a misstep.
The days ahead are unclear for tribes, but hope remains that the Court’s
denial will send a needed message to Congress.

151. Id. at 23–24.
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